Usually, it’s a chain of errors/failures that leads to accidents, after the many years of dissecting and trying to prevent air disasters.
2002 Uberlingen collision is one such case where the reliance on a sole air traffic controller was part of that chain. And that was with one controller instead of the desired two. 50% headcount. Here it’s 1 or 2 instead of 14-15? That’s 7-14% headcount.
We know overworking people and understaffing introduce substantial risk to managing, assisting, and responding to flights. Even supposing this poor soul could adequately manage the workload by themselves, the introduction of a single problem could throw all of it off.
Usually, it’s a chain of errors/failures that leads to accidents, after the many years of dissecting and trying to prevent air disasters.
2002 Uberlingen collision is one such case where the reliance on a sole air traffic controller was part of that chain. And that was with one controller instead of the desired two. 50% headcount. Here it’s 1 or 2 instead of 14-15? That’s 7-14% headcount.
We know overworking people and understaffing introduce substantial risk to managing, assisting, and responding to flights. Even supposing this poor soul could adequately manage the workload by themselves, the introduction of a single problem could throw all of it off.